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Voidability Provisions Under State
Blue Sky Laws
T FE ALMOST LIMITLESS possibilities which exist for the prac-
tice of deception in the sale of securities have prompted state
governments to enact legislation to protect the unwary purchaser.1
In general, this legislation has the dual purposes of regulating the
sale of securities and preventing the perpetration of fraud.2 An
Ohio court has stated that such laws act as "a regulation of busi-
ness and [constraini . . . conduct only to the end of protecting the
public against the imposition of unsubstantial schemes and the
securities based upon them."'  Blue sky laws4 are "designed to be
prophylactic if possible, remedial only if necessary."5
While state law normally provides criminal penalties for fraud
in the sale of securities,6 these sanctions are often unattractive to
purchasers for several reasons. First, there exists a natural reluc-
tance on the part of businessmen to institute criminal proceedings.
Similarly, state administrators are also reluctant to bring a criminal
action against a seller who has unsuccessfully attempted to com-
ply with the many technical requirements of blue sky laws. Ad-
ditional factors such as inadequate state budgets, uneven enforce-
ment, and a lack of administrative procedures to effect rescission
of a contract make civil liability an appealing alternative to a
criminal proceeding.7
A purchaser who decides to forego a criminal action may
proceed under common law, a state securities act provision, or
federal law.' The common law remedies of breach of warranty,
I While this Note will in general discuss the remedies available to a purchaser who
has been victimized by an unlawful sale, some reference will be made to the circum-
stances where it is the seller who is seeking relief. See text accompanying notes 100-
104 infra.
2 Miller v. Griffith, 196 N.E.2d 154 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
3 Id. at 155.
4 The term "blue sky law" derives from the fraudulent practices of some promoters
who were characterized as being so underhanded, that they would, if possible, sell build-
ing lots in the blue sky in fee simple. Loss & CowETr, BLUE SKY LAW 7 n.22 (1958).
5 Jackson v. Robertson, 90 Ariz. 405, 410, 368 P.2d 645, 648 (1962).
6 See Loss & CowETr, op. cit. supra note 4, at 23-24.
7 Id. at 129-30.
8 While a purchaser is free to proceed under a combination of any of these remedies,
his recovery is generally limited to his damages or the maximum amount recoverable
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rescission and deceit often impose insurmountable obstacles in the
path of a purchaser who is seeking recovery from an unscrupulous
seller. For example, a purchaser choosing to sue for a breach of
warranty will generally not be permitted to introduce parol evi-
dence in order to show promises or representations which were
not included in the written contract.' A common law rescission
action may normally be brought only by one in privity with the
seller.'" A tort action for deceit, while not requiring privity, will
usually impose upon the purchaser the burden of proving causa-
tion, damage and, most importantly, scienter."
Nor does federal law always supply a method of redress for
the victimized purchaser. While the provisions of the Securities
Act of 19332 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193418 offer com-
forting relief to most victims of illegal sales, these federal acts are
often limited in their application by such factors as jurisdiction 4 and
exemptions. 5 When a situation arises in which there is no federal
remedy and no convenient common law alternative, a defrauded
purchaser may seek civil relief under the applicable state securi-
ties act or blue sky law.
It is the purpose of this Note to examine one form of relief
often available under state securities acts - the so-called "void-
ability" remedy. 6 Special emphasis will be given to the types of
violations which give rise to this remedy, the ramifications of de-
daring a contract void or voidable, the liability of specific parties
to voidable transactions, and various defenses which may be avail-
able to these parties. Of greatest importance is the effect of the
recent widespread adoption of the Uniform Securities Act on the
under any particular remedy, whichever is greater. 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
1624 (2d ed. 1961). The elements of a violation under each particular method are,
of course, independent of those required for a violation in either of the other two areas.
Cf. Detwiler v. Clavin, 377 Mich. 1, 138 N.W.2d 336 (1965).
9 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1626.
101d. at 1627.
'Id. at 1628.
1248 Star. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1958).
1348 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aa to hh-1 (1964).
14 See Annor., 165 A.L.R. 1232 (1946).
15 See, e.g., Ohio Natl Life Ins. Co. v. Struble, 82 Ohio App. 480, 81 N.E.2d 622
(1948).
16 Nine states have no voidability remedy: Delaware, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota. In most
of these states, however, other civil liability is provided by statute. For a discussion
of other possible remedies under state acts, see Note, 17 W. REs. L. Rnv. 1173 (1966).
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subject of voidability."7 This act, together with the Ohio void-
ability provision," will be the subject of special analysis.
I. VIOLATIONS GIVING RISE TO
ACTIONS FOR RESCISSION
A. Types of Violations
The specific acts or omissions which will allow a purchaser
of a security to void the contract of sale vary widely among the
states. The only classification which seems possible is the sepa-
ration of those states which provide a remedy for any violation of
the blue sky law from those states which restrict the class of void-
able contracts either specifically or systematically.
(1) Statutory Relief for Any Violation.-Fifteen states cur-
rently permit the purchaser of a security to void the contract of
sale if the seller did not comply with even the most technical and
unimportant requirement of the state's blue sky law."9 Among
the less obvious errors which have resulted in a purchaser voiding
the contract are the seller's failure to file reports, advertising
brochures, or amendments, his failure to maintain required re-
cords, to deliver a prospectus, to use subscription blanks or to pay
required fees.2" Tennessee, North Dakota and New Mexico further
extend the seller's already precarious position by rendering void-
able those contracts which violate an order of the commissioner
made pursuant to the state act."'
The criticisms generally levelled at the states allowing void-
ability for any violation are that (1) these statutes place a tre-
mendous burden on sellers who must thoroughly search the state
17At this writing, 5 410 of the UNIFORM SEcuRTEs AcT (which is the section
corresponding to the voidability section in other state statutes) had been substantially
adopted in the following states: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, In-
diana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Okla-
homa, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming.
18 OHIO REv. CODE § 1707.43.
19ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 45 (Supp. 1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.21 (1962); GA.
CODE ANN. § 97-114 (Supp. 1965); HAWAII REv. LAWs § 199-16 (Supp. 1961);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121Y, § 137.13 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 502.23 (1949); MISS. CODE ANN. § 5374 (Supp. 1964); Mo. ANN STAT.
409.240 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-31 (Supp. 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT.
78-22 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-17 (1960); ORE. REv. STAT. § 59.250(1961); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1645 (1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, 5 4225
(1958); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3273(18) (1961).
20 Loss & COWET, op. cit. supra note 4, at 135.
21 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-31 (Supp. 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-17
(1960); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1645 (1964). Compare OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.40.
See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-20 (Supp. 1965).
1150
VOIDABILITY PROVISIONS
securities act in order to be familiar with every technical detail;
(2) such statutes allow an often complex contract to be avoided
on the basis of a minute detail; and (3) these all-encompassing
statutes will permit a buyer who may be very sophisticated in his
knowledge of securities sales to take unfair advantage of a less-
experienced seller by entering into a contract for sale with
knowledge that if the securities decrease in value, the contract may
be voided.22  These criticisms are well-founded. It is not diffi-
cult to envision the situation of a buyer who has become dissat-
isfied with the progress of securities which he has recently pur-
chased searching the records of a corporation until he discovers
a technical violation of the state blue sky law which will allow
him to void his contract and regain his original investment. The
obvious inequity inherent in such a case would seem to constitute
a sufficient indictment of this type of voidability provision.
(2) Voidability in Ohio.-Section 1707.43 of the Ohio Re-
vised Code2" allows a purchaser to void a contract for the sale of
securities if the contract was made in violation of sections 1707.01
to 1707.45 of the Ohio Securities Act and if that violation mate-
rially affects the protection contemplated by the violated provision.
The wording of the statute seems to achieve the balance required
between observance of the rights of the seller, on the one hand, and
the obvious policy against fraudulent sales, on the other. For exam-
2 2 UIFORM SEcumYiEs Acr § 410 (a) (draftsmen's comments) found in Loss
& COWETT, op. cit. supra note 4, at 390-91.
23 Section 1707.43 states:
Every sale or contract for sale made in violation of sections 1707.01 to
1707.45, inclusive, of the Revised Code, is voidable at the election of the pur-
chaser. The person making such sale or contract for sale, and every person
who has participated in or aided the seller in any way in making such sale or
contract for sale, are jointly and severally liable to such purchaser, in an action
at law in any court of competent jurisdiction, upon tender to the seller in per-
son or in open court of the securities sold or of the contract made, for the full
amount paid by such purchaser and for all taxable court costs, unless the court
determines that the violation did not materially affect the protection contem-
plated by the violated provision.
No action for the recovery of the purchase price as provided for in this
section, and no other action for any recovery based upon or arising out of a
sale or contract for sale made in violation of sections 1707.01 to 1707A5, in-
clusive, of the Revised Code, whether based upon contract or tort, and whether
legal or equitable in nature, shall be brought after two years from the date
of such sale or contract for sale.
No purchaser is entitled to the benefit of this section who has failed to
accept, within thirty days from the date of such offer, an offer in writing made
after two weeks from the date of such sale or contract of sale, by the seller or
by any person who has participated in or aided the seller in any way in mak-
ing such sale or contract of sale, to take back the security in question and to
refund the full amount paid by such purchaser.
1966] 1151
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17: 1148
ple, the buyer is not required to show that any misrepresentation was
knowingly made as long as the misrepresentation materially af-
fected the protection envisioned by the act.24 This is an obvious
improvement over the common law action for rescission which
in Ohio required a knowing misrepresentation.25 The buyer's
position is further strengthened by the absence of any necessity for
proof of fraud. In Crane v. Courtright,6 an Ohio court of appeals
stated:
Transactions subject to Section 1707.43, Revised Code, need not
be fraudulent, nor does it follow that the security sold is neces-
sarily worthless. It may in fact be quite valuable. In these re-
spects, compare the remedial provisions of Section 1707.38, Re-
vised Code (violation does not invalidate the security), and Section
1707.41, Revised Code (liability for fraud). Upon failure to reg-
ister, the statute involved here simply grants the purchaser the
right to a unilateral rescission of the transaction and provides for
mutual restitution, i.e., the security for the purchase price. The
statute is not, therefore, a penalty provision in the usual sense. It
is not even compensatory since the purchaser's right is to obtain
restitution of the purchase price, but does not include the right to
recover damages. 27
From the seller's point of view, the Ohio statute is an obvious
improvement over the broader provisions previously discussed. 28
For example, the seller's failure to register the securities within
the time prescribed" would not allow the buyer to void the con-
tract unless this failure materially affected the protection con-
templated by the statute. This requirement avoids the harsh re-
sults often reached under statutes allowing voidability for any
violation. However, it should be noted in this respect that Ohio
courts have generally imposed upon the defendant the burden of
showing that the violation committed was not material.80 In
Biernbaum v. Midwest Oil & Gas Co.,31 the court went even
further, requiring the defendant to show that there was "no rele-
2 4 OHIo REV. CODE § 1707.41 places the burden of showing no knowledge of a
misrepresentation on the defendant.
25 Cf. Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 475, 120 N.E.2d 118, 122 (1954).
262 Ohio App. 2d 125, 206 N.E.2d 913 (1964).
27 Crane v. Courtright, 2 Ohio App. 2d 125, 127-28, 206 N.E.2d 913, 915 (1964).
28 See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
29 See OHIO REv. CODE § 1707.07. For a discussion of the registration require-
ments, see Note, 17 W. RES. L REV. 1126 (1966).
30 Biernbaum v. Midwest Oil & Gas Co., 108 Ohio App. 560, 566, 160 N.E.2d 410,
414 (1959); Miller v. Griffith, 196 N.E.2d 154 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
31 108 Ohio App. 560, 160 N.E.2d 410 (1959).
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vant connection between the protection intended by the Securi-
ties Act and the violation in question.""2
A question which will undoubtedly arise time and again un-
der the Ohio voidability provision involves the determination of
what violations are material. This was the issue presented in
Miller v. Giffith3  which involved an action by the buyer of stock
against the officers of a corporation to recover the purchase price
on the ground that the corporation had not filed the required
registration statement. The defendants claimed that plaintiff's
losses were occasioned by the corporation's insolvency rather than
because of any statutory violation. In rejecting this defense, the
court stated:
This is the very type of situation that the Securities Act was sup-
posed to regulate because it is only in those cases where the corpo-
ration fails or never gets off the ground that there is a need for the
protection of the Securities Act. The fact that the plaintiff hoped
to make a profit is not a defense either because anyone who owns
shares in a corporation does so with the hope of profit and it is not
enough to say that he took a chance and lost. If the corporation
made profits even though the Securities Act was not followed
there would naturally be a claim on the part of plaintiff so the
court feels that the Securities Act is remedial in nature and should
be interpreted to provide the protection that it intended to give,
namely, to people who own shares in corporations in the hope of
making a profit and then learn that there was never any substance
to the corporation in the beginning3 4
In holding for the plaintiffs, the court further noted that while
the filing of an incomplete registration might not materially af-
fect the buyer's statutory protection, the failure to file anything
resulted in there being "no protection whatsoever that could be
affected one way or the other." 5  The emphasis of the Miller
decision on the facts in that case indicates that courts generally will
look to the facts in each case to answer the materiality issue in
the future. Where the violation involves something as substantial
as an affirmative misrepresentation or a failure to register, how-
ever, there is little doubt that the court will find a material effect
on the buyer's protection.
(3) Uniform Securities Act.-Section 410 (a) of the Uni-
32 Biernbaum v. Midwest Oil & Gas Co., 108 Ohio App. 560, 566, 160 N.E.2d 410,
414 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
83 196 N.E.2d 154 (Ohio C-P. 1961).
34 Miller v. Griffith, 196 N.E.2d 154, 156 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
35 Ibid.
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form Securities Act36 allows a purchaser to recover the considera-
tion paid for a security together with interest, costs, and attorneys
fees less any income received on the security, where an offer to
sell or a sale was made in violation of certain provisions of the
act or by means of a misrepresentation of a material fact. The
specificity which characterizes this statute is undoubtedly its finest
attribute. Because it limits the violations which may give rise to
a cause of action for rescission, it avoids the difficulty encountered
under general voidability provisions which permit an action for
even the most technical violation." And because section 410(a)
36§ 4 10(a) states:
[Violation of Registration or Fraud Provision]
(a) Any person who
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 201 (a), 301 or 405
(b), or of any rule or order under section 403 which requires the affirmative
approval of sales literature before it is used, or of any condition imposed un-
der section 304(d), 305 (g), or 305 (h), or
(2) offers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement of a ma-
terial fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are
made, not misleading (the buyer not knowing of the untruth or omission),
and who does not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in
the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the untruth or omis-
sion, is liable to the person buying the security from him, who may sue either
at law or in equity to recover the consideration paid for the security, together
with interest at six per cent per year from the date of payment, costs, and rea-
sonable attorneys' fees, less the amount of any income received on the secu-
rity, upon the tender of the security and any income received on it, or for
damages if he no longer owns the security. Damages are the amount that
would be recoverable upon a tender less the value of the security when the
buyer disposed of it and interest at six per cent.
This section has been adopted with some variation in the following states: ALA. CODE
tit. 53, 5 45 (Supp. 1963); ALASKA STAT. S 45.55.220 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
67-1256 (1966); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-1-21 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. 5 36-312a(a) (1960); IN). ANN. STAT. § 25-873 (Supp. 1965); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-1268 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.480 (1963); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 32A, S 34 (Supp. 1965); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.776(410) (a) (Supp. 1965);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-2022 (Supp. 1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.200 (Supp.
1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-19 (Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 408
(1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-309 (1962); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33
(1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-22 (Supp. 1965); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-522
(1964); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.430 (1961); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-
117.22 (1957). A provision somewhat similar to § 410 (a) is contained in the Ne-
braska code. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-347 (1958). The specific variations adopted by
each of these states, and the reasons therefor, are, unless otherwise indicated, beyond
the scope of this Note. The reader is cautioned to consult the specific state statute rather
than rely on the provisions of the Uniform Act.
37 This rather obvious fact makes the action of the Alabama legislature in adopting
5 4 10(a) all the more mysterious. The legislature chose to forego naming specific
violations which would allow voidability and instead substituted the words "any viola-
tion." ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 45 (Supp. 1963). This substitution, of course, negates
the drafters' purpose in phrasing the statute in specific terms. See UNIFORM SECuR-
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is not framed in terms of "material violations" it bypasses the
problems of factual interpretation likely to occur under the Ohio
statute."8
Section 410(a) (1) permits an action for rescission whenever
an offer or sale violates one or more of seven provisions of the
act: (1) section 201 (a) requiring the registration of broker-
dealers, agents, and investment advisers; (2) section 301 prescribing
the methods of registration of securities; (3) section 405 (b) prohib-
iting misrepresentation as to the effect of registration or exemption;
(4) section 403 prohibiting the violation of any rule or order re-
lating to the filing of sales literature; (5) section 304(d) requir-
ing the use of a prospectus; (6) section 305 (g) prescribing the
escrow of securities and the impounding of proceeds; and (7) sec-
tion 305 (h) requiring the use of certain contract forms in sales
transactions39 The general policy running through all of these
requirements seems to be one of full disclosure to the purchaser.
The registration provisions will allow the state administrative
agency to lend its talent to increasing the buyer's protection by
scrutinizing both the sellers and the securities being sold.
While the provisions of section 410 (a) (1) of the Uniform
Act appear to be fairly straightforward, more difficulty may be in-
curred under subsection (2) which prohibits fraud or misrepresen-
tation. In essence section 410 (a) (2) contains four elements:
(1) the offer to sell or sale of a security (2) by means of any un-
true statement of a material fact or by a misleading omission to
state a material fact (3) where the buyer shows that he did not
know of the untruth or omission and (4) where the seller is un-
able to prove that he did not know or could not with reasonable
care have found out about the untruth or misleading omission.
While these elements are not easily applied, the near identity of
section 410(a) (2) with section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
=ms Act § 410(a) (draftsmen's comments) found in Loss & COWT, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 390-91.
It should be noted that some states -which have not adopted the Uniform Act never-
theless restrict the voidability remedy to specific violations. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 44-2001 (1956); CAL. CORP. CODE § 26100; LA. REV. STAT. § 51:715 (1965);
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 110A, § 18 (1954); Wis. STAT. 0ANN. § 189.18 (1957).
38 See, e.g., Miller v. Griffith, 196 N.E.2d 154 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
3 9 See UNIFORM SEcuRrrIEs AcT § 410(a) (draftsmen's comments) found in
Loss & Cowrt, op. cit. supra note 4, at 391.
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193340 allows "an interchangeability of federal and state judicial
precedence in this very important area."'"
Several aspects of section 410(a) (2) deserve special attention.
First, with respect to the "by means of" clause, it has been stated
that this "clause is not intended to require the buyer to show re-
liance on the untruth. He must only show that he did not know
of it."42  In this regard, the statutory remedy43 is superior to the
common law remedy of rescission which required a showing of
reliance."
Second, it should be noted that in order for the buyer to have
a remedy under section 4 10(a) (2) the misrepresentation must
be as to a material fact. A statement of "fact" in this instance
must be distinguished from a mere statement of opinion."
The issue which will very likely be the most common to occur
under section 410(a) (2) is whether the misrepresentation was of a
material fact. This requirement is not imposed on a buyer who is
proceeding under a common law action for rescission if the mis-
representation was intentionally made.40 Thus, in this respect, the
statutory remedy may be more difficult to pursue than common
law rescission. However, it seems doubtful that any court would
deny a plaintiff statutory relief where there was some connection
between plaintiff's injury and the representation made. For
example, redress has been given where the plaintiff was misin-
formed as to the time of consummation of a securities transac-
tion4" and where the defendants misrepresented the cost of a secu-
4048 Star. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964).
4 1 UNIFORM SEcusUTiEs AcT § 410(a) (2) (draftsmen's comments) found in Loss
& COWETT, op. cit. supra note 4, at 391.
4 2 UNIFORM SEcuRmTiEs AcT § 410(a) (2) (draftsmen's comments) found in Loss
& COWEI-, op. cit. supra note 4, at 392. See Murphy v. Cady, 30 F. Supp. 466, 468
(D. Me. 1939), aff'd, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1941).
43 This discussion of section 410(a) (2) will often rely upon authority which has
reference to section 12 (2) of the Securities Act.
44 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1627.
451d. at 1700-01.
461d. at 1705. However, where the misrepresentation was innocently made, the
requirement of materiality was imposed even at common law. Cf. Shulton, Inc. v. Ru-
bin, 239 Md. 669, 212 A.2d 46 (Ct. App. 1965). See also 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACrs
§ 1500 (rev. ed. 1936); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 470, 476 (1933); RESTATE-
MENT, RESTITUTION § 9, 28 (1937).
4 7 Guardian Inn Corp. v. Rubinstein, 192 A.2d 296 (D.C. App. 1963).
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rities sale to plaintiff.48 Thus, the disadvantage in choosing the
statutory remedy does not appear to be substantial.
Section 410(a) (2) contains two clauses relating to the bur-
dens of proof in a rescission action. The buyer is required to show
that he did not know of the untruth or omission while the seller
in order to escape liability has the burden of proving that he did
not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of the untruth or omission. The latter opportunity is one
which was not given to the seller at common law. 9 At least one
Uniform Act state has refused to adopt this portion of the statute. 0
B. Stage of a Transaction at Which a Violation Occurs
In addition to analyzing the types of violations which may give
rise to an action for rescission under state securities acts, it is neces-
sary to note which stages of a transaction are subject to the man-
date of the statute. The major issue which occurs in this area is
whether an offer which is made before the offeror has complied
with all of the blue sky requirements can be the basis for an action
for rescission if the subsequent sale is not consummated until all
of the requirements have been satisfied.8" While the state courts
have been divided on this question,5" the modern and majority
view appears to be that a purchaser may void a contract even if
the alleged illegality attached only to the offer.5" The majority
view was adopted by an Illinois court in Silverman v. Chicago
Ramada Inn, Inc.5" In holding for the plaintiff-purchaser, the
court stated:
The solicitation by the defendants constituted a sale under the
statute as did the payments made... [thereafter]. The plaintiffs,
if they had known that the securities were illegally sold, could have
instituted their rescission action after the agreement to purchase
was reached; they could have sued to recover after the first pay-
48 Shulton, Inc. v. Rubin, 239 Md. 669, 212 A.2d 476 (Ct. App. 1965). See also
Fourth Nati Bank v. Webb, 131 Kan. 167, 290 Pac. 1 (1930); 3 POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENcE § 878c (5th ed. 1941).
49 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1704.
50 Tx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (1964).
51 It is well recognized that an illegal offer does not give rise to a civil cause of ac-
tion if no sale results. 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1695.
52 Compare Bauer v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 285 Mass. 117, 188 N.E. 708 (1934)
(contract not rescindable), with United Bank & Trust Co. v. Joyner, 40 Ariz. 229, 11
P.2d 829 (1932) (contract not enforceable).
533 Loss, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1696.
5463 Ill. App. 2d 96, 211 N.E.2d 596 (1965).
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ment or after any one of the interim payments. All were sales
under the Act and all were voidable at the option of the pur-
chasers.55
Where case law has not extended the coverage of the securi-
ties acts to mere solicitations or offers, many states have done so
by statute. While the Ohio voidability provision" refers only to
"sales" or "contracts for sale," its coverage is extended by the defi-
nition of sale contained in section 1707.01 (C) (1). That section
includes within the meaning of sale all attempts to dispose of secu-
rities, options of sale, solicitations of sale, solicitations of offers to
buy, subscriptions and offers to sell.
Section 410 (a) of the Uniform Securities Act by its own terms
dearly extends to both offers to sell and actual sales. The drafts-
men's comments to section 410(a) list four major reasons for ex-
tending the statute's coverage to offers: (1) the majority of cases
favor such an extension; (2) the only method of controlling so-
called "pre-effective" or "pre-filing" offers seems to be by the
threat of civil liability; (3) the "thirty-day out clause" of section
410 (e) may be used by a seller to escape liability where the viola-
tion was inadvertent; (4) section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933, upon which section 4 10(a) (2) is modeled, was amended
in 1954 to extend to offers as well as to sales.5"
The extension of the rescission remedy to offers seems sup-
portable from a public policy viewpoint. In many cases, the solici-
tation or offer, rather than the actual sale, is the source of various
representations. To allow an unscrupulous seller to escape lia-
bility by complying with various formalities after an offer or a
fraudulent solicitation has been made would seem to create an un-
necessary loophole in the protection contemplated by blue sky laws.
I. EFFECT OF A VIOLATION
The rights of the parties to a contract for the sale of securities
are obviously affected by the existence of a blue sky violation on
the part of the seller. In general, these rights may be affected in
three ways: first, the contract may be voidable by the buyer; sec-
55 Silverman v. Chicago Ramada Inn Inc., 63 Ill. App. 2d 96, 102, 211 N.E.2d 596,
599 (1965).
5 6 OHIO REv. CODE § 1707.43.
57 UNIFORM SEcuRmEs AcT § 410 (a) (draftsmen's comments) found in Loss
& CowETr, BLUE SKY LAw 391 (1958).
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ond, the contract may be entirely void; or third, the contract may
be unenforceable by the seller.
A. Voidability by the Buyer
It is well recognized in most states that a buyer may sue to
recover the purchase price of a transaction which was carried out
in violation of the state securities act." Of course, where the
state statute merely denominates the transaction as voidable, the
purchaser may elect to go through with the sale despite the viola-
tion by the seller. 9
(1) Ohio.-The right of the purchaser to void his contract
where the seller has violated the securities act has been recognized
in Ohio both by statute" and by case law.61 Section 1707.43 of
the Ohio Revised Code makes such contracts "voidable at the elec-
tion of the purchaser." In Crane v. Courtright,62 an Ohio court
of appeals recognized section 1707.43 as creating "a statutory
remedy for restitution of the purchase price."63  The section was
also relied upon by the purchaser in Yoder v. So-Soft of Ohio,
Inc.64 There, the plaintiffs and defendants entered into a contract
by which the plaintiffs, in exchange for consideration, were to re-
ceive a water softener plus the right to 100 dollars for every cus-
tomer which plaintiff referred to defendant and which subse-
58 See, e.g., Ham v. Blankenship, 194 F.2d 430 (5th Cit. 1952); Moore v. Manu-
facturers Sales Co., 335 Mich. 606, 56 N.W.2d 397 (1953); Farrar v. Hood, 56 N.M.
724, 249 P.2d 759 (1952). While this Note is specifically concerned with voidability
provisions, an extensive discussion of such subjects as the measure of damages permitted
under such statutes or the statutes of limitation which apply would be of little use since
these questions are almost alway decided by statute. Most statutes limit damages to
the consideration paid plus costs, interest and, in some cases (including the Uniform
Act), attorneys' fees. Ohio allows the purchaser to recover only the amount paid plus
reasonable court costs. OrIo PR v. CODE § 1707A3. Similarly, most require a deduc-
tion for any interest derived from the securities.
The statutes of limitation prescribed by the statutes usually vary between one and
three years. While the majority of states provide that the statute begins to run at the
time of the sale, several statutes state that the statute does not commence to run until
the buyer learns of the violation. The Uniform Act provides that "no person may sue
under this section more than two years after the contract of sale." UNWoRM SECUR-
inss Acr § 410(e). Ohio provides that an action must be commenced within two
years of the sale or the contract for sale. OsIo REv. CoDE § 1707.43. See generally,
48-2 OHIo Jir. 2D Securities Regulation § 18, at 769-71 (1966).
59 Cf. Moore v. Manufacturers Sales Co., supra note 58.
60 OHo REv. CODE § 1707.43.
6 1 Crane v. Courtright, 2 Ohio App. 2d 125, 206 N.E.2d 913 (1964); Yoder v. So-
Soft of Ohio, Inc., 202 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio C.P. 1963).
62 2 Ohio App. 2d 125, 206 N.E.2d 913 (1964).
63 Crane v. Courtright, 2 Ohio App. 2d 125, 127, 206 N-E.2d 913, 914 (1964).
64 202 NX.E.2d 329 (Ohio C.P. 1963).
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quently purchased a water softener from defendant. The court
held that this contract constituted the sale of a security under Ohio
Revised Code section 1707.01 and that the defendant thus had to
be licensed as a securities dealer.65 His failure to do so gave the
purchaser the option to void the entire contract. "
(2) Uniform Securities Act.-The relationship between sec-
tion 410(a) of the Uniform Securities Act and the normal type
of voidability provision is not precisely dear. Instead of expressly
allowing a defrauded purchaser to void his contract of sale, sec-
tion 410 (a) gives him the right to "sue either at law or in equity
to recover the consideration paid" plus interest, costs and attorneys'
fees less any income received. At first glance, this language ap-
pears to be merely a different method of allowing the purchaser
to rescind. But the draftsmen's comments to the section at least
imply that the statute is not a voidabiity provision in its normally-
understood meaning:
There are two basic difficulties with the pattern most commonly
found, which is one of declaring any sale or contract to be "'void-
able" if its making violated any provision of the statute. First,
the seller has to search every substantive provision of a typically
complicated statute before he knows whether his contract or sale is
voidable. Secondly, there are so many substantive provisions, and
they are often so technical, that voiding a substantial contract
seems to be a remedy out of all proportion to the seriousness
of the violation. For example, why should a sophisticated buyer
be able to recover the purchase price from the seller when the
market generally has gone down just because he later discovers
that the seller filed a required report a day late?67
Careful analysis of the two criticisms presented in the comments
reveals that they are not (or should not be) directed at the void-
ability remedy itself. Rather, both criticisms concern the voiding
of contracts for merely technical, as opposed to substantial, viola-
tions. Thus, both criticisms can be met by merely limiting the
violations for which voidabiity is allowed to those of major pro-
portions. This has been done in the Uniform Act and, therefore,
there does not seem to be any logical reason for excluding the
voidabiity terminology from the act's provisions.
There are two interpretations which can be placed upon sec-
tion 410(a). First, the section's omission of the term voidable
65Yoder v. So-Soft of Ohio, Inc., 202 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ohio C.P. 1963).
66 Ibid.
6 7UN'IFORM SEcuRITas Acr § 410 (a) (draftsmen's comments) found in Loss
& COWETr, op. cit. supra note 52, at 390-91.
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may be considered to be meaningless in practical application since
the result achieved appears to be the same as that which will occur
under a voidability provision. In this respect, the language of an
English court in 1692 may be relevant:
[E]very contract made for or about any matter or thing which is
prohibited and made unlawful by any statute is a void contract, tho
the statute it self doth not mention that it shall be so, but only in-
flicts a penalty on the offender, because a penalty implies a pro-
hibition, tho' there are no prohibitory words in the statute.68
Thus, despite the ambiguous words of the draftsmen's comments,
section 410 (a) may reasonably be called a voidability provision.
But another interpretation of section 410 (a) is equally plaus-
ible. It may be that the drafters were concerned with the voiding
of substantial contracts, of which the sale of securities was only
one aspect, when there was a violation of the securities act. For
example, a single contract may contain provisions by which a cor-
poration sells assets, goods, and stock to an individual in exchange
for cash. Assuming that the stock was not properly registered,
would the buyer then be able to rescind the entire contract and re-
gain the money which he paid for the assets and goods as well as
the stock. Section 410(a)'s limitation on recovery to the "con-
sideration paid for the security" would seem to limit the purchaser
in this situation to the amount of cash exchanged for stock. Thus,
the rest of the transaction would be enforceable by the seller. A
different result might be reached under a pure voidability provi-
sion. An excellent example is the case of Yoder v. So-Soft of
Ohio, Inc.69 which was previously discussed. There, the original
contract covered both a water softener and securities. The seller's
failure to obtain a license allowed the buyer to rescind the entire
contract including that portion covering the water softener.
It is submitted that section 410(a) be interpreted to allow a
purchaser to void an entire contract (including non-securities pro-
visions) only where it appears to the court that the purchaser
would not have agreed to the non-stock provision but for the
fact that he was receiving securities as a part of the transaction.
This interpretation would seem to allow a more equitable result
especially in cases where the securities provisions of a contract con-
stitute only a small portion of the entire transaction.
68 Bartlert v. Vinor, Carth. 252, 90 Eng. Rep. 750 (K.B. 1692). See Northern
v. Elledge, 72 Ariz. 166, 171, 232 P.2d 111, 114 (1951).
69202 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio C.P. 1963).
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B. Violation Causing a Void Contract
The state securities acts in California and Oregon contain pro-
visions which declare that either the security sold or the sale made
in violation of the state's blue sky requirements is void." While
there are judicial decisions outside of these two states which have
reached a similar conclusion,"' no other states so provide by statute.
There are two important results which follow from the fact
that a security 2 or the sale of a security is void. First, no subse-
quent act of the buyer, no matter how affirmative, may ratify the
contract for sale. 3 Second, the subsequent assignment of the secu-
rity to a bona fide purchaser does not validate the stock.74 An
opposite result would be reached where the transaction is merely
voidable. In such a case, the buyer could transfer good title to a
bona fide purchaser.75 Similarly, ratification by the buyer would
be recognized under a voidabiity statute.76
While the void-voidable distinction might once have been con-
sidered of prime importance in the area of state blue sky laws,
Professor Loss has stated that "the void-voidable dichotomy has no
great practical significance in the blue sky field today, if it ever
did."'77  The ability of modern courts to fashion an equitable de-
cree has nearly obliterated the hardships which formerly resulted
from a strict application of the "void" terminology. 78
C. Unenforceability by the Seller
What appears to be the majority rule on the enforceability
of a contract for the sale of securities which was made in viola-
7 0 CAL. CORP. CODE § 26100 (security void); ORE. REv. STAT. § 59.250 (1961)
(sale void).
71 See, e.g., Anderson v. Mikel Drilling Co., 287 Minn. 487, 489 n.2, 102 N.W.2d
293, 296 n.2 (1960).
7 2 Ohio specifically provides that a security sold in violation of the state blue sky
law is not void or invalid. OHIO REv. CODE § 1707.38.
73 Pollak v. Staunton, 210 Cal. 656, 293 Pac. 26 (1930). See Loss & COwETrT,
op. cit. supra note 57, at 132; Annot., 87 A.L.R. 42 (1933).
74 Becker v. Stineman, 115 Cal. App. 740, 2 P.2d 444 (1931). See Loss & Cow-
Er, op. cit. supra note 57, at 132.
7 5 Edsun v. O'Connell, 190 Minn. 444, 252 N.W. 217 (1934).
76 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1633 (2d ed. 1961), quoting, RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACrS § 475 comment b (1933).
77 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 76, at 1633.
78 Cf. Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate Se-
curities Act: Ii, 34 CALIF. L. REV. 543 (1946).
1162
VOIDABILITY PROVISIONS
tion of a provision of the state blue sky law was stated in United
Bank & Trust Co. v. Joyner:"
Since... the contract herein sued on was made in violation of the
provisions of the statutes, it conferred no rights upon the company
and will not be enforced by the courts, and defendant was author-
ized to set up its illegality as a defense to an action by the com-
pany on his subscription. 0
The United Bank decision is representative of the fact situation which
ordinarily gives rise to the enforceability issue, that is, the seller
who has not complied with the provisions of the state securities
act suing to obtain the purchase price from the buyer. While the
better view seems to be that the buyer can interpose the illegality
of the sale as a defense, cases have often held to the contrary.8"
It is difficult to justify a holding that the seller can obtain the pur-
chase price in such a situation in view of the fact that the buyer
may subsequently rescind the contract and thus regain the pur-
chase price. It may be for this reason that the drafters of the Uni-
form Securities Act included a provision prohibiting any suit on
a contract made in violation of a provision of the act.'
A dispute has arisen among courts as to whether a person en-
gaged in a so-called joint venture may enforce a contract for the sale
of securities against his fellow-adventurer where the contract in-
volved a blue sky violation.83  In Gales v. Weldon,"4 the Missouri
Supreme Court defined a joint adventure as follows:
A 'joint adventure' is founded entirely on contract, either ex-
press or implied. It can exist only by the voluntary agreement of
the parties to it. It has been defined as 'an association of persons
to carry out a single business enterprise for profit, for which pur-
pose they combine their property, money, effects, skill, and knowl-
edge.' 48 C.J.S. Joint Adventures § la. It is in the nature of a
partnership, generally governed by the same rules of law, the prin-
cipal difference being that a joint adventure is usually limited to a
single transaction. As a general rule, in order to constitute a joint
adventure, there must be a community of interest in the accom-
plishment of a common purpose, a mutual right of control, a right
7940 Ariz. 229, 11 P.2d 829 (1932).
8o United Bank & Trust Co. v. Joyner, 40 Ariz. 229, 235, 11 P.2d 829, 832 (1932).
81 See 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 76, at 1671 and cases cited therein.
82 UNIFORM SEcuRrriEs Acr 410(f).
83 Compare Hathway- v. Porter Royalty Pool, Inc. 296 Mich. 90, 295 N.W. 571,
modified, 292 Mich. 733, 299 N.W. 451 (1941) (joint adventure not within Blue
Sky Law), with Jackson v. Robertson, 90 Ariz. 405, 368 P.2d 645 (1962) (joint ad-
venture subject to Blue Sky Law).
84282 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1955).
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to share in the profits and a duty to share in such losses as may be
sustained. 5
Those courts which exempt joint ventures from the coverage of
the blue sky laws do so apparently on the theory that any viola-
tions would affect only the participants in the venture as opposed
to the general public.8" This view was rejected in Jackson v. Rob-
ertson87 where the court concluded that
if use of the corporate form by joint ventures violates the Securi-
ties Act the public may be injured nonetheless .... [I]t is ...
obvious that the Securities Act was not enacted to protect any of
the parties to this law suit. Nevertheless, the contract herein called
for issuance of corporate securities which might very well have
been foisted upon the investing public by any of the five men in-
volved. It is the capacity for harm and danger to the public as
well as accomplished fraudulent transactions to which the Securi-
ties Act is directed.88
It is submitted that the conflict among the courts on this point
could be settled through the application of the following principle:
If the defendant can show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the securities in question might reasonably find their way into the
hands of parties other than those participating in the venture, then
the plaintiff's attempt to enforce the contract should be denied. A
lack of such a showing, however, should be a sufficient indication
to the court that its enforcement of the contract will not be con-
trary to the purposes of the blue sky laws.
III. PERSONS LIABLE
A. Seller and Related Parties
Voidability provisions in general describe the parties who may
be liable for a violation of a state securities act. While a few
states expressly limit liability to the seller alone,8" the majority of
states which have not adopted the Uniform Securities Act extend
liability to the seller and to officers, directors, and agents of the
selling corporations who participated or aided in the making of the
sale. Participation or aid has been interpreted as implying "some
85 Gales v. Weldon, 282 S.W.2d 522, 527 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1955).
86 Cf. Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
8790 Ariz. 405, 368 P.2d 645 (1962).
88Jackson v. Robertson, 90 Ariz. 405, 408-09, 368 P.2d 645, 647 (1962).
89 See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 110A, § 18 (1954); MIss. CODE ANN. 5 5374
(Supp. 1964); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3273(18) (1961).
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activity in inducing the purchaser to invest."9  In this regard, a
Florida appellate court in Hughes v. Bie91 held that a corporate
attorney could not be held liable under that state's voidability pro-
vision where the attorney's participation was limited to the prepa-
ration and execution of the legal documents involved in the sale.
Similarly, the willingness of a bank to become the depository of
funds does not amount to a personal participation or an aid in
making a sale. 2  On the other hand, in Foreman v. Holsman3
an Illinois court of appeals held the trustee of a mutual ownership
trust liable as a seller for the consideration paid by investors for a
beneficial interest in the trust which interest was sold in violation
of the state securities act. The court noted that the trustee had
important functions and powers for the protection of investors and,
in effect, made the project in question possible by means of the
trust.
Section 1707.43 of the Ohio Revised Code, which extends
liability to the seller and those persons participating in or aiding
the sale, has been interpreted as indicating "an intent on the part
of the General Assembly to reach all persons who have had any-
thing to do with the sale of the securities in violation of the Secu-
rities Act."9  In Crane v. Courtright,95 an Ohio court of appeals
held that allegations that the defendant had provided active assis-
tance to the sellers, had encouraged the buyer to purchase, and had
acted as an intermediary in the sale were sufficient, if proven, to
hold the defendant liable. These interpretations by the Ohio
courts are representative of the liberal approach which is gener-
ally taken towards the question of how far voidability coverage
should be extended.9"
90 ichols v. Yandre, 151 Fla. 87, 95, 9 So. 2d 157, 160 (1942). See also Trump
v. Bader, 84 Ariz. 319, 327 P.2d 1001 (1958); Davis v. Walker, 170 Neb. 891, 104
N.W.2d 479 (1960); Robinton & Sowards, Florida Securities Act: A Re-Examination,
12 U. MIAM L REV. 1 (1957).
91182 So. 2d 281 (Fla. App. 1966).
92 Sorenson v. MacEilrod, 286 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1960).
93 16 Ill. App. 2d 466, 148 N.X.2d 595 (1957).
94 Miller v. Griffith, 196 N.X.2d 154 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
952 Ohio App. 2d 125, 206 N.B.2d 913 (1964).
96 See, e.g., Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956). In Brown,
the court extended the definition of "seller" to include any person who represents a link
in the chain of the selling process. The drafters of theTexas Securities Act, which is
based upon the Uniform Securities Act, specifically noted that Brown is still to be re-
garded as the ruling case law in Texas as to who is liable. TEx REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 581-33 (1964) (drafters' comment). For a further discussion on the extent of
liability under blue sky laws, see Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1030 (1958).
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Section 410 (b) of the Uniform Securities Act is more specific
in its coverage than the majority of the older voidability provi-
sions. It extends to persons who control the seller, to partners,
officers and directors of the seller and those persons occupying
similar capacities, and to employees and broker-dealers who materi-
ally aid in the sale. The position of these non-sellers is enhanced,
however, by the act's provision allowing the non-seller to escape lia-
bility by proving that he did not know, and in the exercise of reas-
onable care could not have known, of the violation. It seems reas-
onable to infer that the lack of knowledge, in order to constitute
a defense, must be as to the actual fact of the violation rather than
to the legal requirement itself. An excellent example of this distinc-
tion was presented in a recent Oregon case, Spears v. Lawrence Sec.,
Inc.97 There, the defendants, who were salesmen for the actual
seller, claimed that while they knew of the non-registration of cer-
tain securities which were sold, they did not know that the law re-
quired the securities to be registered. The Oregon Supreme Court
held that by requiring a non-seller to have knowledge of the viola-
tion in order to be liable, 8 the Oregon legislature intended only that
the person knew the security was not registered. "[I]t is not neces-
sary, in addition, to prove that the person knew that the law re-
quired the security to be registered."99
B. Liability of the Buyer
Occasionally, a situation may arise in which the bad faith at-
tached to the sale of a security is on the part of the buyer rather
than the seller. In general, the courts have refused to extend the
voidability remedy to the seller in these situations."' In Brown v.
Cole, ' the Texas Supreme Court stated explicitly that "the Act
does not undertake to regulate purchasers or to protect sellers against
purchasers. Only sellers and sales are regulated."' ° Only one state,
Arizona, gives statutory relief to the defrauded seller by allowing
97 239 Ore. 583, 399 P.2d 348 (1965). It should be noted that this case was not
decided under the Uniform Securities Act. Nevertheless, it amply demonstrates the
distinction under discussion.
98 ORE. REV. STAT. § 59.250 (1961).
99 Spears v. Lawrence Sec., Inc., 239 Ore. 583, 587, 399 P.2d 348, 350 (1965).
100 See Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 150 Tex. 39, 237 S.W.2d 256 (1951).
101 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956).
102 Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 628-29, 291 S.W.2d 704, 708 (1956) (dictum).
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him to recover damages plus interests and costs from the unscrupu-
lous buyer."0 3
It is submitted that all state legislatures would be wise to adopt
a statute similar to that of Arizona in order to give the defrauded
seller the same protection afforded the buyer in these situations.
Forcing the seller to pursue his common law remedies' in order
to gain relief seems no more desirable than limiting the buyer to
these remedies in like circumstances.
IV. DEFENSES AVAILABLE TO THE
SELLER IN A VOIDABILITY ACTION
A discussion of some of the defenses which may be raised by a
seller against whom a purchaser is proceeding is necessary to
a complete presentation of the subject of voidability. °5  It
should be recalled that two possible defenses under the Uniform
Securities Act have already been discussed. The seller may be able
to prove that he did not know and could not have known of an un-
truth which has given rise to a buyer's action under section 410 (a)
(2)."6 Similarily, non-sellers are given an equal chance to escape
liability by showing a lack of knowledge of a violation under sec-
tion 410 (b).°
A. Failure to Tender
States which extend the voidability remedy to a purchaser of se-
curities generally require the buyer to tender the securities back to
the seller in order to obtain a judgment against him. Since the pur-
pose of this requirement is obviously to insure restitution08 and pre-
vent unjust enrichment, the buyer's failure to tender would bar him
from recovery. In discussing the proper time and place for a tender
to be made, the court in Crane v. Courtright09 observed:
[Tender] is merely one means of affording such protection to the
103 AIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-2002 (1956).
104 That this is the only recourse left open to the seller, see 3 Loss, op. cit. supra
note 76, at 1636.
105 There are, of course, innumerable defenses which might be raised depending
upon the facts of a particular case. Those discussed appeared to be the most meritorious
of defenses which are often raised. For a discussion of a less-successful defense, see
Annot., Waiver of Rights or Release of Liability in Advance of Controversy Under State
Securities Act or Blue Sky Law, 61 A.L.R.2d 1308 (1958).
106 See text accompanying note 49 supra.
107 See text accompanying notes 96-99 supra.
108 Crane v. Courtright, 2 Ohio App. 2d 125, 206 N.X.2d 913 (1964).
1092 Ohio App. 2d 125, 206 N.E.2d 913 (1964).
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defendant. Its origin lies in the historical practice of the common
law courts (King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer), and
arose out of the fact that those courts generally refused to grant
conditional judgments.... The chancellor was not circumscribed
by such inflexibility, and could and did assure that there would be
mutual restitution by simply conditioning his final decree upon the
plaintiffs tendering restitution. Even assuming that we must con-
tinue to honor such procedural anachronisms of the common law
in common law actions, it is certainly competent for the Legisla-
ture to provide that in this statutory action a tender in open court
is sufficient., 0
The court concluded that since tender in open court was sufficient,
no allegation of tender need be included in the plaintiff's petition."'
The Ohio statutory requirement that the tender be made "to the
seller in person or in open court""' 2 has been construed as permit-
ting tender in open court to be made to any participant who is li-
able rather than merely to the seller."' The Ohio provision is
similar to approximately one-half of the other voidability statutes
in this respect and there is no reason to believe that these other stat-
utes will not be construed in a similar manner."4  Similarly, the
Uniform Securities Act allows tender to be made at any time before
the entry of judgment."' Texas, however, omitted this provision
when it adopted the Uniform Act.1 ' Thus, it seems likely that
tender will be required at an earlier time under the statute--pos-
sibly before the filing of the complaint.
B. Failure to Accept Seller's Offer to Buy Back
The vast majority of voidabiity provisions bar an action for
rescission by the buyer if the buyer has failed to accept within a
specified time (usually thirty days) a written offer by the seller to
take back the security and refund the buyer's money."' Thus, if a
seller can show the buyer's failure in this respect, it will constitute
a complete defense to an action for rescission. The purpose of such
provisions is obviously to provide a seller who has made an inno-
110 Crane v. Courtright, 2 Ohio App. 2d 125, 128, 206 N.E.2d 913, 915-16 (1964).
lIbid. See also Bulard v. Garvin, 1 Ariz. App. 249, 401 P.2d 417 (1965).
1 12 R nv. CODE § 1707A3.
"3 Crane v. Courtright, 2 Ohio App. 2d 125, 129, 206 N.E.2d 913, 916 (1964).
114 See Cross v. Pasley, 270 F.2d 88, 93 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
902 (1960); 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 76, at 1674.
115UNIFORM SEcutrnas AcT § 410(c).
28 TnX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (1964) (drafters' comments).
117 Professor Loss lists twenty states as having such a provision. 3 Loss, op. cit. supra
note 76, at 1641.
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cent mistake with an opportunity to rectify his error without having
to wait for the buyer's decision on whether to sue. The seller, if he
so desires, is thus able to avoid a situation in which he relies on a
certain purchase only to have the buyer re-appear at a later date and
rescind the sale.
Ohio Revised Code section 1707.43 contains a unique and curi-
ous limitation on the seller's right to make an offer to repurchase.
No such offer is effective to start the thirty-day period in which the
buyer must accept if the offer is made within two weeks from the
date of the sale or the contract for sale. This provision does not
appear to have been interpreted by any Ohio cases and no reason for
its existence is readily apparent. No such limitation appears in the
Uniform Act."' This restriction on the seller seems even more
illogical when one considers that many inadvertent violations might
be discovered by the seller within this period. Forcing him to de-
lay his offer to repurchase until two weeks after the sale appears to
be an unnecessary restriction on the seller's rights which could re-
sult in serious financial injury if the value of the stock drops sharply.
Section 410 (e) of the Uniform Securities Act allows the seller
to make a written offer to repurchase at any time before suit. The
offer must be to refund not only the purchase price but also six per
cent interest; however, the seller may deduct any income which the
buyer has received from the stock. As in most of the states with
strict voidability provisions, the Uniform Act bars any action by
the buyer if he fails to accept such an offer within thirty days." 9
C. Estoppel and Pari Delicto
The issue of whether a seller against whom a buyer of securi-
ties is proceeding for rescission can avail himself of the defenses
of estoppel or pari delicto2° has arisen in innumerable cases.'"
Estoppel is the broader of the two terms, of course, since it may ex-
tend to situations in which the plaintiff's actions, while not actually
wrongful, operate in some manner to create an equitable defense in
the seller. Many chses, however, seem to use the terms almost in-
1 8 UNIpORM SEcuarris Acr § 410 (e).
119 An interesting question occasionally arises when the sale is made to joint pur-
chasers. Must the offer to repurchase be made to both buyers? One court has answered
this in the affirmative and refused to bar a subsequent action for rescission by the joint
purchasers. Hummel v. Kranz, 126 N.W.2d. 786 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1964).
1 2 0 Pari delicto refers to the maxim that "where the wrong of both parties is equal,
the position of the defendant is the stronger." Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 479, 491 (1962).
121 For a partial listing of these cases, see Annot., 84 A.LJ.R2d 479 (1962).
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terchangeably when dealing with blue sky law violations. This is
especially true where the alleged defense arises out of the buyer's
participation in the organization or management of the corporation.
(1) Estoppel.-Various activities on the part of buyers have
been held to estop them from rescinding a securities sale. In gen-
eral, however, these activities may be grouped into one of two cate-
gories: (1) The buyer received some financial benefit from the se-
curities before attempting to rescind; or (2) The buyer actively par-
ticipated in the management of the corporation's activities before
bringing suit.
Representative of the first category of cases is In re Racine Auto
Tire Co."m where certain stock subscribers attempted to rescind their
purchase. The court held that the buyers were estopped on the
basis that they had received dividends over a period of two years,
had participated in stockholder meetings, and had exchanged their
old stock certificates for new ones when the capital stock was in-
creased.
Estoppel through participation in corporate management was
found in Tucker v. McDell's Inc." There, the buyer was elected
a vice-president and a director of the corporation, took an active
part in corporate affairs, attended directors' and shareholders' meet-
ings for more than a year, and voted for liquidation. The court con-
cluded that this conduct estopped the buyer from rescinding the
stock purchase.'
An Ohio court of appeals recognized the validity of the estoppel
defense in Cleveland Printing Ink Co. v. Phipps."5 The court held
that, "where [al formula for which stock was issued by corpora-
tion was worth par value of the stock, and corporation used the
formula for a long period, and stock was issued, and persons receiv-
ing it became officers and voted the stock, directors were estopped
to seek cancellation on ground that transaction was contrary to
Blue Sky Law."' 26  The basic consideration running through all
of the estoppel cases in this category seems to be the degree of con-
'=290 F. 939 (7th Cir. 1923).
12350 Tenn. App. 62, 359 S.W.2d 597 (1961).
124 Tucker v. McDell's Inc., 359 S.W.2d 597 (Tenn. App. 1961). See also Moore
v. Manufacturer's Sales Co., 335 Mich. 606, 56 N.W.2d 397 (1953); Schriver v. B & B
Oil Co., 311 Mich. 118, 18 N.W.2d 392 (1945).
125 30 Ohio App. 161, 164 N.E. 641 (1928).




trol over and contact with the corporation. Where these elements
are lacking, courts will generally not apply the estoppel doctrine. 27
(2) Pari delicto.-Generally, courts will refuse to find a buyer
and seller of securities in pari delicto unless they are equally culpa-
ble.' 28  This requirement has occasionally been carried to an amaz-
ing extreme. For example, in Schvaneveldt -v. Noy-Burn Milling &
Processing Corp.,'129 the buyer, in addition to purchasing stock in a
company, served as its general manager, bought shares in a related
corporation with the promise of a directorship, attended meetings
where the purported incorporation of the related business was dis-
cussed, and encouraged other persons to buy stock in the new cor-
poration. Nevertheless, in an action for rescission, the Utah Su-
preme Court refused to find that these activities placed the buyer
in pari delicto with the seller. One might well inquire here as to
whether the court should have at least found equitable estoppel.
A less extreme situation was faced by the Arizona Supreme
Court in Trump v. Badet.30 The buyer in Trump was required by
the sale agreement to serve as an officer and to attempt to sell more
stock. In rejecting the defendant's claim that these facts allowed
the defense of pari delicto, the court stated:
The answer to that contention is simply that the transaction was
outlined in the original subscription agreement and that the bona
fide acts of the purchaser of stock in compliance with the terms
of the original agreement do not import illegality to such pur-
chaser in effectuating the terms of such an agreement.1 1
It seems reasonable to conclude that the pari delicto defense has
been greatly restricted by the courts, almost to the point of its com-
plete obliteration in blue sky cases. In any event, it is safe to say
that estoppel surely presents a much more inviting and promising
alternative to the seller who is confronted with a voidability action.
V. CONCLUSION
An examination of state voidability provisions reveals the im-
pressive lengths to which the courts and legislatures have gone in
attempting to discourage and eliminate underhanded tactics in the
127 See, e.g., Monroe v. Dixon, 152 So. 2d 744 (Fla. App. 1963).
12SSchvaneveldt v. Noy-Burn Milling & Processing Corp., 10 Utah 2d 1, 347 P.2d
553 (1959).
12910 Utah 2d 1, 347 P.2d 553 (1959).
130 84 Ariz. 319, 327 P.2d 1001 (1958).
131 Trump v. Badet, 84 Ariz. 319, 322, 327 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1958).
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sale of securities. Some inroads still must be made, however, es-
pecially in those states which still provide the voidability remedy
for overly-technical violations. Legislatures would do well to con-
sider the virtues of the Uniform Securities Act in this respect.
The Ohio legislators should examine closely any reasons for the
two-week restriction on the seller's right to offer to rescind, as pro-
vided in section 1707.43. Certainly, Ohio's unique position on this
question is relevant in judging the merits of this limitation.
The major conclusion that is derived from a study of the
area of voidability is that the legislatures and courts have now gone
as far as they should in seeking to protect the purchaser of securities.
Attention should now be turned towards the possibility that the ex-
tensive rights of buyers may be abused. The pendulum of advan-
tage, which for so long had been on the side of the seller, has now
swung towards the center. The utmost care is necessary to prevent
its momentum from carrying it to the opposite extreme.
DALE C. LAPoRTE
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